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Abstract
An innovative firm with private information about its indivisible
process innovation chooses strategically whether to apply for a patent
with probabilistic validity or rely on secrecy. By doing so, the firm
manages its rivals’ beliefs about the size of the innovation, and af-
fects the incentives in the product market. A Cournot competitor
tends to patent big innovations, and keep small innovations secret,
while a Bertrand competitor adopts the reverse strategy. Increasing
the number of firms gives a greater (smaller) patenting incentive for
Cournot (Bertrand) competitors. Increasing the degree of product
substitutability increases the incentives to patent the innovation.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the incentives of an innovative firm to patent its process inno-
vation in an oligopoly. A patent discloses the technology to the firm’s competitors,
and gives some protection against expropriation of the disclosed technology. However,
patents are imperfect. They only give protection with a certain probability (Lemley
and Shapiro, 2005). Moreover, surveys in the US (Levin et al., 1987, and Cohen et
al., 2000) and Europe (Arundel, 2001) find that high-level executives do not con-
sider patenting the most eective appropriability mechanism for process innovations.
Instead, secrecy was often considered as a more eective way to protect those innova-
tions. In spite of the perceived weak protection, firms do apply for patents (e.g., Kim
and Marschke, 2004, and Hall, 2005). One reason for this is that a patent enables
a firm to signal information about its innovation in a credible, verifiable way (Long,
2002).1 In this paper, I analyze this motive and explore its economic consequences.
I analyze the patenting incentives in a model of asymmetric information about the
size of an innovation. In such a setting an innovative firm faces the following trade-
o. On the one hand, patenting a technology is a way to persuade the competitor
of the technology’s e!ciency. This creates a signaling eect. On the other hand,
the potential expropriation of a patented technology yields a more e!cient, and more
“aggressive” competitor in the product market. This expropriation eect gives the
innovative firm a disincentive to apply for a patent. The innovative firm manages the
expectations of its competitor in the product market, and thereby aects his conduct,
by patenting certain technologies while keeping other technologies secret.
A firm can patent selectively by making dierent patenting choices for dierent
innovations. Selective patenting of an indivisible innovation gives either a patented
innovation or a trade secret.2 This makes patents and trade secrets substitutes. By
contrast, if an innovation is divisible, the firm can also choose to patent only certain
parts of any given innovation, while keeping the remaining parts secret. In this case,
patenting and secrecy are complementary strategies. Whether the intellectual prop-
erty strategies are substitutes or complements in practice remains an open issue. At
first sight, data from the Yale Survey and Carnegie Mellon Survey (CMS) in the US,
and the European Community Innovation Survey (CIS) seem to support at most weak
1Of course, there are alternative explanations for this so-called patent paradox, such as the build-
up of patent portfolios to improve a firm’s bargaining position (e.g., Hall and Ziedonis, 2001).
2If a process innovation cannot be broken in small parts, then the full disclosure requirement of a
patent only leaves the choice between truthful disclosure or complete concealment of the technology.
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complementarity between the appropriation strategies (Levin et al., 1987, Cohen et
al., 2000, Arundel and Kabla, 1998, Hussinger, 2006, and Pajak, 2010).3 However,
there are at least two reasons why these studies tend to over-estimate the comple-
mentarity between patenting and secrecy. First, the studies are based on firm-level
data. A firm may treat patents and secrets as substitutes at the innovation level by
using patenting exclusively for some of its innovations and secrecy exclusively for its
other innovations. However, it would contribute to a positive correlation between
patenting and secrecy at the firm level.4 Second, when dierent intellectual property
instruments are used exclusively in dierent stages of an innovation’s development,
this will also give an over-estimation of complementarity (Arundel and Kabla, 1998).
Since there does not appear to be strong evidence for either relationship between
patenting and secrecy, and there tend to be significant dierences between industries
(e.g., Arundel and Kabla, 1998, and Moser, 2010), substitutability could be expected
to fit well with some industries, while complementarity would fit better with other
industries. In this paper, I adopt the assumption of substitutability, as in Horstmann
et al. (1985), Gill (2008), and Jansen (2006, 2010).5 By contrast, Anton and Yao
(2003, 2004) analyze the trade-o between expropriation and signaling for an inno-
vation that can be subdivided into arbitrary small parts. Thereby, my analysis is
complementary to the analyses of Anton and Yao. Interestingly, my analysis gives
dierent predictions on a firm’s intellectual property strategy.
The paper shows that the strategy of an innovative firm depends on the mode of
competition in the industry. When firms compete in output levels, a firm has an incen-
tive to appear as an e!cient, “tough” competitor in the product market to discourage
its competitors (strategic substitutes). Consequently, in the absence of expropriation,
3The principal components analysis of the Yale Survey data in Levin et al. (1987), and the factor
analysis on the 1994 CMS in Cohen et al. (2000) suggest that there is no strong correlation between
the importance of patenting and secrecy as methods of appropriation in US data. Arundel and
Kabla (1998) find in the 1993 CIS that there is substitutability between patenting and secrecy for
product innovations, and only weak complementarity for process innovations. In data from the 2004
CIS, Pajak (2010) finds only a small positive pairwise correlation between patenting and secrecy
for product innovations of small, innovative firms in France. By contrast, Hussinger (2006) finds a
strong correlation between the patent propensity and the use of secrecy in data from the 2000 CIS
among German firms. At the same time, however, she finds that 35% of the firms use one of the
instruments exclusively (i.e., 15% use only patents, and 20% use only secrecy), while 41% of the
firms used both patenting and secrecy (the remaining 24% use neither patents nor secrets).
4Pajak (2010) mitigates this problem by focusing on small firms with one innovation on average.
5The former two papers study models of entry deterrence, whereas I consider accommodating
strategies. Jansen (2006) studies a simple model with two types, and therefore cannot analyze
selective patenting strategies. Jansen (2010) studies a complementary problem of technology sharing
by competing innovative Cournot duopolists in the absence of intellectual property protection.
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a Cournot oligopolist has an incentive to patent big innovations, and keep small in-
novations secret. Indeed, an innovative firm may adopt this strategy, if a patent gives
a moderate risk of expropriation. Further, if patenting gives a high risk of expropri-
ation, the expropriation eect tends to dominate, and a Cournot competitor keeps
its innovation secret. Conversely, for patents with a low risk of expropriation, the
signaling eect tends to dominate, and all innovations are patented (Okuno-Fujiwara
et al., 1990). Empirical findings by Mäkinen (2007), Moser (2010), and Pajak (2010)
are consistent with the strategy of patenting big innovations to a greater extent than
small innovations.6 >7 Interestingly, Anton and Yao (2003) obtain the opposite predic-
tion in a related model with divisible innovations, i.e., small innovations are patented
to a greater extent than big innovations.8 A firm with a divisible innovation can signal
the innovation’s size by patenting only a small part of its innovation. However, in my
paper such a strategy is not feasible, since I consider an indivisible innovation.
A change of the mode of competition from competition in quantities to competi-
tion in prices changes the direction of the signaling eect. A Bertrand oligopolist only
discloses ine!cient technologies to persuade the competitor that he will face relaxed
competition in the product market (strategic complements). That is, competition in
prices gives an incentive to patent dierent technologies than competition in quanti-
ties. Pajak (2010) finds that small firms in the French intermediate goods industry
are more likely to patent small innovations than big innovations, which is consistent
with these incentives. As far as I know, my paper is the first to analyze the trade-
o between signaling and expropriation in a model of Bertrand competition, and to
compare the two modes of competition.9
A switch from a market where firms strategically set output levels (Cournot com-
6In innovation-level data on Finnish product innovations from 1985-1998, Mäkinen (2007) finds
that more novel and significant product innovations were patented more often than smaller innova-
tions. Moser (2010) finds in innovation-level data on UK and US innovations at World Fairs from
1851-1915 that award-winning innovations were more likely to be patented. When considering all
small innovative firms in France together, Pajak (2010) finds in firm-level data of the 2004 CIS that
large product innovations are more likely to be patented.
7Alternatively, such a patenting strategy could also be consistent with a model in which a non-
strategic firm chooses between patenting at a fixed cost and secrecy. However, such a model would
yield no patenting for industries where secrecy gives better protection against expropriation than
patenting. That is, it would not resolve the patent paradox. Moreover, Moser (2010) finds only a
weak elasticity with respect to patenting fees, when comparing patenting by UK and US innovators.
8Anton and Yao (2003) diers in a second respect from my paper. Whereas Anton and Yao study
a drastic innovation, I consider a non-drastic innovation. However, Appendix C suggests that Anton
and Yao’s qualitative result also holds in a model with a non-drastic (divisible) innovation.
9Anton and Yao (2003, 2004), Gill (2008), and Jansen (2006, 2010) analyze the trade-o between
expropriation and signaling in models with strategic substitutability in the production stage.
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petition), to a market where they set prices (Bertrand competition) increases the
competitive pressure for the firms (e.g., see Singh and Vives, 1984). By comparing
the patenting strategies of a Cournot competitor with the strategy of a Bertrand
competitor, I make a first step in characterizing the eect of competitive pressure on
patenting strategies. In addition, by applying insights from the theory of monotone
comparative statics (e.g., see Vives, 2005, for an excellent survey), I characterize the
eects of changes in two alternative measures of competitive pressure. First, increas-
ing the number of non-innovative firms in the industry intensifies product market
competition. Second, an increase in the degree of product substitutability is an alter-
native way of increasing the competitive pressure. These analyses try to contribute to
the current debate on the eects of competitive pressure on innovative activity. The
existing literature typically focuses on the relationship between competitive pressure
and incentives to create new knowledge (see, e.g., Belleflamme and Vergari, 2006,
Gilbert, 2006, Vives, 2008, and Schmutzler, 2010, for overviews). By contrast, I study
the eects of competitive pressure on the incentives to diuse new knowledge. In
other words, my analysis is complementary to the existing literature.
The dierent measures of competitive pressure aect the patenting incentives in
dierent ways, since they have dierent eects on the responsiveness of the firms’
product market strategies. Whereas non-innovative firms become less responsive to
changes in the prices or output levels of an innovative firm when their number grows,
they become more responsive when products become closer substitutes. More respon-
sive competitors tend to adjust their strategies more drastically when they become
informed about the size of the innovation. Hence, more responsive product market
strategies of competitors tend to give a relatively stronger signaling eect, and thereby
a greater incentive to patent an innovation. The paper confirms that a greater substi-
tutability between goods gives more patenting. Moreover, an increase in the number
of non-innovative firms gives less patenting when firms compete in prices. By contrast,
when firms compete in output levels, an increase in the number of non-innovative com-
petitors gives more patenting. This is due to a greater responsiveness of the innovative
firm’s output strategy to output changes of its competitors.10
10Empirical analyses that consider the eect of competitive pressure on the propensity to patent
are scarce and inconclusive. Mäkinen (2007) finds only a weakly significant negative eect (i.e., as
for entry in a Bertrand oligopoly), by taking competition to be intense if price competition is at
least an important factor for initiating the development of an innovation. Duguet and Kabla (1998)
find no significant eect from the logarithms of the average market share and the average Herfindahl
concentration index on patent propensity. A careful, empirical analysis of the relationship between
the intensity of product market competition and the propensity to patent awaits future research.
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My paper also relates to recent literature on endogenous knowledge spillovers. For
example, De Fraja (1993), Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998), Kamien and Zang (2000),
Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003), Fosfuri and Rønde (2004), Encaoua and Lefouili
(2006), and Milliou (2009) analyze the choice of technology diusion in oligopoly
models of complete information.11 Whereas expropriation of technological knowledge
aects the spillover choice in these papers, there is no role for signaling. By contrast,
signaling plays a central role in my model.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model. Section
3 characterizes the equilibrium product market strategies under patenting and trade
secrecy, and the equilibrium patenting strategies. Section 4 discusses the eects of
competitive pressure on the incentive to patent an innovation. Finally, section 5
concludes the paper. Appendix A contains the proofs of the paper’s propositions,
Appendix B gives more detailed derivations, and Appendix C covers three extensions.
2 The Model
Consider Q + 1 risk-neutral firms, firm L and firms 1> ==> Q , producing dierentiated
goods, with Q  1. Firm L, the innovative firm, obtains a patentable non-drastic
process innovation, which yields a production cost L 5 [> ], drawn from p.d.f. i :
[> ] $ R+ (and corresponding c.d.f. I : [> ] $ [0> 1]), with 0   ? .12 The
production cost L is private information to firm L. Firms 1> ==> Q , the non-innovative
firms, have an ine!cient, non-patentable technology, with the production cost , i.e.,
1 = === = Q = .13
After firm L learns its cost, it makes its patent choice. Firm L chooses whether
to file for a patent and consequently reveal its cost truthfully, v(L) = L , or to keep
its cost secret and send the uninformative message v(L) = B. The firm’s patenting
strategy can be written as follows:
v(L) =
½ B, if L 5 S
L , if L @5 S (2.1)
where S  [> ] denotes the set of technologies that are kept secret.14
11Papers in this line of research often build on the seminal work by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988) about research joint ventures.
12This specification allows for uncertainty about the existence of an innovation by assigning a
positive probability mass to the atom L = .
13The assumption that there is only one innovative firm is made for simplicity. Section 5 discusses
the patenting incentives when there are more innovative firms in the industry.
14Alternatively, instead of the uninformative message, B, a secretive firm could choose to release
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Patents are always granted, but their validity is challenged in court.15 The firm’s
patent for the new technology is successfully defended in court with probability S ,
where 0  S ? 1. However, with probability 1  S the patent is invalid, and the
firms 1> ==> Q can imitate the patent holder’s technology without incurring any cost.16
A trade secret remains secret with probability V, but with probability 1  V the
secret leaks out to the competitors, enabling them to imitate the leaked technology at
no additional cost. To make the problem interesting, I assume that imitation is more
likely under patenting than under secrecy S ? V  1.17 For the analysis of patent
incentives there is no loss of generality to set V = 1 and S =  with  ? 1.18 The
parameter  measures the relative protection of patents vis-à-vis secrets.
Finally, after messages are received and the validity of the patent is determined,
firms set the output levels of their dierentiated goods simultaneously (Cournot com-
petition).19 Firm c with cost c chooses its output, tc  0, and earns the profit:
c(q; c) = (Sc(q) c)tc (2.2)
with c 5 {L> 1> ==> Q}. At the outputs q  (tL > t1> ==> tQ), the inverse demand for the
good of firm c is linear in quantities:
Sc(q) =  tc  
X
n 6=c
tn> (2.3)
with c> n 5 {L> 1> ==> Q}.20 Firm L’s innovation is non-drastic, i.e., I assume that
the commonly available technology . This would give the same eects on competition, i.e., no
expropriation and no precise signal about the firm’s actual technology. When secretive types pool
with the worst type of the innovative firm, and the worst type has a positive probability mass (i.e.,
there is uncertainty about the existence of an innovation), this has an eect on the beliefs of the
non-innovative firms. However, this does not change the qualitative results of the paper.
15The assumption that a firm with the worst technology draw (i.e., L = ) can get a patent is
made for simplicity. Given free access to the existing, old technology, a patent of L =  only serves
as a certification device, since imitation is irrelevant for L = . Hence, this assumption gives the
same results as the alternative assumption that a patent of technology  is always invalid.
16Clearly, the probability of holding an invalid patent can also be interpreted as the probability
with which the patent validity is challenged in court, and the defense of the patent fails.
17A model with stronger patent protection (i.e., S  V) would yield the patenting of all tech-
nologies in equilibrium, since the signaling benefits of patenting (e.g., Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 1990)
would be reinforced by the benefit of less or equally frequent expropriation. Assuming S ? V is
consistent with theoretical work (Anton and Yao, 2003) and empirical findings (Cohen et al., 2000).
18If S is the profit from a valid patent, V is the profit from a secret, and L is the profit after
imitation, then the expected profit gain from patenting instead of secrecy is: [SS +(1S )L ]
[VV +(1 V)L ]. This profit dierence equals: [SS +(V  S )L ] VV . Clearly, the sign
of this net profit is the same as the sign of: [S + (1 )L ]V , with   S @V .
19Later, in section 3.2, I also consider the model in which firms set prices (Bertrand competition).
20In this model of Cournot competition, one can also interpret the innovation as a product inno-
vation, where the representative consumer’s intrinsic willingness-to-pay for the innovation is  L .
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  2  . Parameter  represents the degree of product dierentiation, with
0 ?   1. The greater , the more substitutable the firms’ goods.21
I solve the game backwards, and restrict the analysis to pure-strategy equilibria.
3 Equilibrium Strategies
3.1 Cournot Competition
First, I derive the equilibrium output levels for any given patent choice and belief.
Subsequently, I characterize the equilibrium patenting strategies.
3.1.1 Output Strategies
Suppose that firm c anticipates that its competitor n has a marginal cost n in the
technology subset Tn  [> ], and uses the output strategy tn(n) for n 5 Tn. Maxi-
mization of expected profits by firm c with marginal cost c then yields the following
best response function (for c> n 5 {L> 1> ==> Q}):
ufc(q3c; c) =
1
2
Ã
 c  
X
n 6=c
H{tn(n)|n 5 Tn}
!
= (3.1)
If firm c has marginal cost c, it expects marginal costs
P
n 6=cH{n|n 5 Tn} from its
competitors, and the competitors believe that firm c’s marginal cost is in the subset
Tc, then the firm sets the following output in equilibrium:
tfc
³
c>
X
n 6=c
H{n|n 5 Tn}; Tc
´
 1
(2 +Q)(2 )
µ
(2 ) ( c)
+ 
X
n 6=c
(H{n|n 5 Tn} c) +

2
· Q [c H{c|c 5 Tc}]
¶
(3.2)
In particular, three situations can emerge. In the first two situations, the firms
choose outputs under complete information. These situations emerge after firm L
patents its technology L , i.e., TL = {L}. The cost of non-innovative firms 1> ==> Q
depends on the validity of firm L’s patent. First, if the patent is valid, then the non-
innovative firms cannot adopt the new technology, i.e., q =  and Tq = {} for q =
1> ===> Q . In equilibrium, the outputs are tfL(L > Q; {L}) and tfq(> L+(Q1); {L})
for q = 1> ==> Q . Second, if the patent is invalid, then imitation gives all firms the
21For example, the markets are independent for  = 0, and the goods are homogeneous for  = 1.
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marginal cost L . In this case, each firm sets the symmetric equilibrium output level
tfc(L > QL ; {L}) for c 5 {L> 1> ==> Q}.
Finally, after firm L adopts secrecy there is asymmetric information about firm L’s
marginal cost L (i.e., TL = S for some S  [> ]), and no imitation is possible (i.e.,
q =  and Tq = {} for q = 1> ===> Q). Consequently, the equilibrium output levels
are tfL(L > Q;S) and tfq(> H{L |L 5 S}+ (Q  1); {}) for q = 1> ==> Q .
In any case, firm c’s profit equals: fc(•) = tfc(•)2, for c 5 {L> 1> ==> Q}.
3.1.2 Patenting Strategies
Firm L with innovation L bases its patenting decision on the comparison of the
profit from secrecy, fL(L > Q;S), and the expected profit from patenting. Patenting
generates the profit from a valid patent, fL(L > Q; {L}), with probability , and the
profit from an invalid patent, fL(L > QL ; {L}), with probability 1  . The firm
prefers secrecy whenever fL(L > Q;S)  fL(L > Q; {L})+(1)fL(L > QL ; {L}),
which can be written as:
fL(L > Q; {L})fL(L > Q;S)  (1)
£
fL(L > Q; {L}) fL(L > QL ; {L})
¤
(3.3)
for L 5 [> ] and S  [> ]. A firm that switches from secrecy to patenting changes
the beliefs of the competitors. The competitors learn from a patent that the tech-
nology is actually L instead of the expected technology H{L |L 5 S}. This changes
their conduct in the product market (i.e., a non-innovative firm “moves along” its best
response curve). Consequently, the innovative firm replaces the profit fL(L > Q;S)
with the profit fL(L > Q; {L}) if the patent is valid. The left hand side of inequality
(3.3) captures this signaling eect of patenting. If a patent would always be valid,
then this would be the only eect of patenting as compared to secrecy.
However, a patent is not always valid. The patent turns out to be invalid with
probability 1. In this case, the switch from secrecy to patenting gives a profit loss of
fL(L > Q; {L}) fL(L > QL ; {L}). Imitation makes firms 1> ==> Q more “aggressive”
competitors (i.e., the firms’ best response functions shift outwards, to the right), which
reduces the innovative firm’s output and profit. The right hand side of inequality (3.3)
captures this expected loss from expropriation.
In short, firm L chooses secrecy if (3.3) holds, i.e., the signaling eect is weaker
than the expropriation eect. Before stating the proposition, which results from the
trade-o between signaling and expropriation, I define the following critical value:
r  1 
2
µH{L} 
  
¶ tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q; [> ])
tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q; {})
(3.4)
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where 0 ? r ? 1.
Proposition 1 For any equilibrium, there exists a critical value f, with   f 
, such that firm L chooses the patenting strategy vf in (2.1) with S = [f> ]. In
particular, (a) there exists an equilibrium in which firm L keeps any technology secret
(i.e., f = ) if and only if   r, with r as in (3.4); (b) there exists an equilibrium
in which firm L patents all technologies (i.e., f = ) if and only if   1 1
2
; (c) if
r ? 1 1
4
, then for any r ?  ? 1 1
4
 there exists an equilibrium with  ? f ? .
The intuition for this result lies in the analysis of the signaling eect. Since firms
compete in output levels in the product market, their product market strategies are
strategic substitutes. Consequently, if firm L discloses a technology which is less e!-
cient than expected, then the non-innovative firms adjust their outputs upwards (i.e.,
they “move up” along their best response curves), and become more aggressive com-
petitors. That is, in this case the expropriation eect and the signaling eect reinforce
each other, and give a disincentive to apply for a patent. Conversely, disclosure of a
technology which is more e!cient than expected makes the non-innovative firms less
aggressive competitors in the product market (strategic substitutes). That is, in this
case the expropriation and signaling eect conflict, and the patenting incentives are
determined by their trade-o.
Extreme strengths of intellectual property right give the following incentives. On
the one hand, perfect protection (i.e.,  $ 1) eliminates the expropriation eect of
patenting a technology. The remaining signaling eect gives firm L an incentive to
patent any technologies with above-average e!ciency levels. This drives the expected
cost level of secret technologies up to the highest cost level (i.e., S = {}). In other
words, for  approaching 1 the unraveling result applies (Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 1990),
yielding full patenting in equilibrium (i.e., f = ).
On the other hand, in the absence of patent protection ( = 0), the expropria-
tion eect outweighs the signaling eect. Patenting of technology L would enable the
non-innovative firms to imitate, and set output levels tfq(L > QL ; {L}) for q = 1> ==> Q .
By contrast, trade secrecy enables non-innovative firms to set an equilibrium output
level of at most tfq(>Q; {}). That is, trade secrecy yields less aggressive competitors
when imitation is certain, since tfq(>H{L |L 5 S}+(Q1); {})  tfq(>Q; {}) 
tfq(L > QL ; {L}) for any L and S. Consequently, firm L adopts secrecy for any tech-
nology in equilibrium. For intermediate strengths of intellectual property protection,
a more subtle trade-o emerges between signaling and expropriation.
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The comparison between the critical value r, on the one hand, and the values
1 1
2
 and 1 1
4
, on the other, depends on the size of the average technology, H{L}.
In particular, r is decreasing in the average technologyH{L}, and several equilibrium
outcomes can emerge, as Figure 1 illustrates for  = 1. The abbreviations FP, FS,
r
-
6
0
 
H{L}

1
2
( + )
13
4
1
2
FP
FP/SP
FS
FP/FS
SP
Figure 1: Equilibrium patenting (Cournot competition)
and SP stand for full patenting, full secrecy, and selective patenting, respectively.
These equilibrium strategies dier from the strategies in Anton and Yao (2003).
The innovative firm in Anton and Yao patents small innovations to a greater extent
than big innovations, whereas here the reverse tends to happen. The model of An-
ton and Yao (2003) has a divisible and drastic innovation, whereas my model has an
indivisible, non-drastic innovation. The analysis in Appendix C suggests that also
a model with a divisible, non-drastic innovation yields more patenting of small in-
novations than big innovations, as in Anton and Yao (2003). In particular, in the
absence of protection (i.e.,  = 0), the innovative firm chooses the equilibrium strat-
egy b*(L) = 2L + (1  2 ), which means that the firm patents only technologies of
relatively low e!ciency (i.e., L  2+(1 2 )), while it does not patent technologies
that are more e!cient. Similar equilibrium strategies emerge for weak patent protec-
tion (for more details, see Appendix C). Clearly, such a strategy is not feasible for a
firm with an indivisible innovation. That is, the assumption of indivisibility of the
innovation has a non-trivial eect on the strategies that the innovative firm chooses
in equilibrium. By contrast, for su!ciently strong protection (i.e.,   1  
2
), the
signaling eect dominates, which gives the innovative firm an incentive to patent its
innovation completely. This is analogous to my result in Proposition 1(b).
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3.2 Bertrand Competition
Now I turn to the model in which firms choose the prices of their goods simultaneously
in the last stage (Bertrand competition). In particular, firm c with cost c chooses its
price, sc  0, and earns the profit:
c(p; c) = Gc(p)(sc  c) (3.5)
for c 5 {L> 1> ==> Q}. Here Gc(p) is the direct demand at prices p  (sL > s1> ==> sQ):
Gc(p) =
1
(1 )(1 +Q)
µ
(1 ) [1 + (Q  1)]sc + 
X
n 6=c
sn
!
> (3.6)
where c> n 5 {L> 1> ==> Q}. I assume that the goods are su!ciently dierentiated (i.e.,
 is su!ciently low), such that all firms produce in equilibrium.
3.2.1 Pricing Strategies
Firm c with marginal cost c, who anticipates that its competitor’s marginal cost n
is in the subset Tn  [> ], has the following best response function:
uec(p3c; c) =
1
2
c +
(1 )+ Pn 6=cH{sn(n)|n 5 Tn}
2[1 + (Q  1)] = (3.7)
If firm c has marginal cost c, it expects marginal costs
P
n 6=cH{n|n 5 Tn} from its
competitors, and the competitors believe that firm c’s marginal cost is in the subset
Tc, then the firm sets the following price in equilibrium
sec
³
c>
X
n 6=c
H{n|n 5 Tn};Tc
´
= c +
pec
³
c>
P
n 6=cH{n|n 5 Tn};Tc
´
[2 + (Q  2)][2 + (2Q  1)] (3.8)
for c> n 5 {L> 1> ==> Q}, with the equilibrium margin:22
pec
³
c>
X
n 6=c
H{n|n 5 Tn};Tc
´
 (1 )[2 + (2Q  1)]( c)
+ [1 + (Q  1)]
X
n 6=c
(H{n|n 5 Tn} c) +

2
· Q(H{c|c 5 Tc} c)= (3.9)
After firm L patents its technology L , the firms set prices under complete informa-
tion. If the patent is valid, then firm L chooses the marginpeL(L > Q; {L}) in equilib-
rium, while the non-innovative firm q set peq(> L +(Q 1); {}) for q = 1> ===> Q . If
22As usual, the equilibrium price is increasing in the expected costs. The equilibrium margin is
decreasing in the own cost, since only part of a firm’s cost increase is passed through to consumers.
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the patent is invalid, each firm has the marginal cost L , and choosespec(L > QL ; {L})
for c 5 {L> 1> ==> Q}.
Finally, if firm L adopts secrecy, the non-innovative firms remain uninformed about
the technology L , and anticipate the patenting strategy (2.1) for some S  [> ].
In equilibrium the firms L and q = 1> ==> Q choose the margins peL(L > Q;S) and
peq(>H{L |L 5 S}+ (Q  1); {}), respectively.
In any case, in equilibrium firm c supplies the following output level and earns the
following expected profit, respectively (for c 5 {L> 1> ==> Q}):
tec(•) 
1 + (Q  1)
(1 )(1 +Q) ·
pec(•)
[2 + (Q  2)][2 + (2Q  1)] (3.10)
ec(•) 
1 + (Q  1)
(1 )(1 +Q)
µ pec(•)
[2 + (Q  2)][2 + (2Q  1)]
¶2
= (3.11)
3.2.2 Patenting Strategies
The patenting choice of a firm that competes in prices (strategic complements) also
trades o the expropriation eect and a signaling eect. For technologies with above-
average e!ciency levels both eects of patenting are negative. In particular, potential
expropriation of the technology makes the rivals (firms 1> ==> Q) compete more aggres-
sively. Moreover, the rivals update their beliefs in an unfavorable direction, since they
learn that firm L is more e!cient (and aggressive) than expected. This makes the ri-
vals compete even more aggressively, since the actions are strategic complements. In
short, the firm has no incentive to patent any e!cient technologies. This brief descrip-
tion of the patenting incentives already suggests that the firm’s patenting strategies
under Bertrand competition dier from the patenting strategies under Cournot com-
petition. Whereas the firm may choose to patent only e!cient technologies under
Cournot competition, it has a clear disincentive to do so under Bertrand competition.
For technologies with a below-average e!ciency level the two eects of patenting
are in conflict. On the one hand, the expropriation eect still gives firm L an incentive
to keep the technology secret. However, on the other hand, now the signaling eect
gives an incentive to apply for a patent. For su!ciently high cost parameters the
signaling eect outweighs the expropriation eect, and disclosure softens the conduct
of the non-innovative firms in the product market. That is, although imitation of a
minor innovation makes the firms 1> ==> Q slightly more productive competitors, the
firms charge a higher price, since they drastically downgrade their beliefs about the
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aggressiveness of firm L’s pricing strategy.23 As a result, firm L has an incentive
to patent such a technology. In short, firm L has an incentive to patent ine!cient
technologies, and keep e!cient technologies secret.
Proposition 2 In any equilibrium, there exists a critical value e, with  ? e ? ,
such that firm L chooses the patenting strategy ve in (2.1) with S = [> e].
In other words, a Bertrand competitor always patents some technologies in equi-
librium. In the limit, for  $ 1, the expropriation eect vanishes, and firm L patents
all technologies (i.e., lim<1 e = ). As before, the unraveling result holds in this
case. Interestingly, even in the absence of intellectual property rights (i.e.,  = 0)
firm L shares some technologies in equilibrium. In spite of the full expropriation of
any disclosed technology, the innovative firm still has an incentive to share some tech-
nologies with its competitors (i.e., any L A e), as is shown in Proposition 2. This
results from the firm’s incentive to strategically manage its competitors’ expectations
in the product market.
Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium patenting incentives for a Bertrand duopolist
(Q = 1) in the absence of patent protection ( = 0). The bold lines represent the best
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Figure 2: Equilibrium patenting (Bertrand competition,  = 0)
response functions of the firms for extreme technologies, i.e., ueL(sq; ) and ueL(sq; )
for firm L, and ueq(sL ; ) and ueq(sL ; ) for firm q. If firm L shares its technology, the
23For example, for a firm with the least e!cient technology (L = ) the expropriation eect is
absent, while the signaling eect remains, if firms 1> ===> Q do not hold degenerate beliefs about firm
l’s cost (i.e., H{L |L 5 S} 6= ), and is at its strongest.
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equilibrium prices correspond to a point on the line T-T0. For example, if the firm has
technology  and shares it, the equilibrium prices correspond to point T0; if it shares
e, then the firms reach equilibrium point E; sharing technology  yields point T.
The adoption of secrecy gives the following. Firm q has technology  and it believes
that firm L has a pricing strategy that corresponds to the expected best response
H{ueL(sq; L)|L  e}, which lies between the curves ueL(sq; e) and ueL(sq; ). The
point where firm L’s expected best response crosses firm q’s best response ueq(sL ; )
determines firm q’s equilibrium price level, seq(> H{L |L  e}; {}). Firm L plays a
best response against the price seq(> H{L |L  e}; {}), which yields a point along
the line S-S0. For example, if the firm keeps technology  secret, the equilibrium prices
correspond to point S0; if it hides e, then the firms reach equilibrium point E; hiding
technology  yields point S. Comparing the equilibrium prices that firm L sets after
technology sharing with the firm’s prices under secrecy gives the following. If firm
L has a lower cost than e, then it can reach a higher equilibrium price by adopting
secrecy. For example, the firm that hides technology  sets price seL(> ; [> e]) which
is greater than the price it would set if it were to share the technology, seL(> ; {}),
since point S0 lies above point T0. By contrast, if firm L’s technology is less productive
than e, then technology sharing gives higher equilibrium prices. For example, the
least e!cient type sets seL(> ; {}) after it discloses, which is greater than its price
under secrecy, seL(> ; [> e]), since point T lies above point S. The threshold value for
patenting, e, is exactly the cost at which firm L is indierent between patenting and
trade secrecy (point E), given beliefs of firm q consistent with patenting strategy ve
in (2.1) for S = [> e].
3.3 Comparative Statics
In the next sections I consider comparative statics results for the extremal equilib-
rium thresholds (Milgrom and Roberts, 1994), since there may be multiple equilibria.24
That is, I consider the eects of changing a parameter value on the lowest and high-
est equilibrium thresholds of the patenting strategies vf in Proposition 1 and ve in
Proposition 2.
An increase of the patent validity parameter  (i.e., stronger patent protection)
yields more patenting in equilibrium, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 3 Any extremal equilibrium threshold f in patenting strategy vf is non-
decreasing in , and any extremal equilibrium threshold e in ve is decreasing in . In
24If the equilibrium is unique, then this reduces to the standard monotonicity results.
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the limit, for  $ 1, firm L chooses the patenting strategy vf(L) = ve(L) = L for
any L 5 [> ] in the unique equilibrium.
In other words, the stronger the patent protection, the weaker the expropriation
eect, and the stronger firm L’s incentive to patent the technology. This is intuitive.
The uniform technology distribution (i.e., I (L) = (L  )@( ) for L 5 [> ])
yields an easy solution. Figure 3 illustrates the proposition for a uniformly distributed
technology L . The bold lines in Figure 3(a) illustrate the threshold values f of the
f
-
6
f

0 1
2
r 3
4
1 

PatentSecret
Fig. 3(a): Cournot competition
¢
¢¢®
e
-
6

0
e

1

Patent
Secret
Fig. 3(b): Bertrand competition
Figure 3: Eect of protection (uniform distribution)
Cournot competitor’s patenting strategy vf in Proposition 1 for  = 1. Technologies
above the curve remain secret, while technologies below the curve are patented. In
Figure 3(b) the bold, downward-sloping curve sketches the threshold level e of the
Bertrand competitor’s strategy in Proposition 2. Here technologies above the curve
are patented, while technologies below the curve are kept secret.
A change of the technology distribution function has the following eects:
Proposition 4 Let  be a parameter of distribution I such that H{L |L A {} and
H{L |L  {} are increasing in  for all { 5 [> ]. Then any extremal equilibrium
threshold f of strategy vf is non-decreasing in , while any extremal threshold e of
strategy ve is increasing in .
Skewing the distribution towards ine!cient technologies (by increasing ) gives
a stronger signaling eect to a Cournot competitor. The disclosure of an e!cient
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technology by a patent creates a more drastic update of the non-innovative firms’
beliefs, and thereby a greater output eect. The stronger signaling eect gives a
greater incentive to patent technologies. The reverse holds for a Bertrand competitor
that considers patenting an ine!cient technology. An increase of  yields a weaker
signaling eect, which gives the innovative firm a smaller patenting incentive.
For example, truncated exponential distributions satisfy the condition in Proposi-
tion 4. Assume that the technology L lies in interval
£
0> 
¤
, and has the distribution
I (L ;) =
¡
1 h3L@
¢
@
³
1 h3@
´
. An increase of the hazard rate parameter 
increases the conditional expected costs H{L |L A {} and H{L |L  {} for all
{ 5 [0> ].25 Then Proposition 4 implies that the equilibrium patenting threshold f
is non-decreasing in , while threshold e is increasing in .
4 Competitive Pressure
In this section I analyze the eects of competitive pressure on the incentives to patent
the technology L . First, I increase the competitive pressure by switching from com-
petition in output levels (Cournot) to competition in prices (Bertrand). Second, I
increase the number of non-innovative firms in the industry. Finally, I increase the
degree of substitutability between products.
4.1 Mode of Competition
The competitive pressure on the innovative firm increases when the firms switch from
competition in quantities to competition in prices (Singh and Vives, 1984). The
comparison of equilibrium patenting strategies of Propositions 1 and 2 depends on
the strength of intellectual property right protection ().
In particular, for su!ciently weak patent protection (e.g.,   min{1  1
2
> r})
an innovative firm patents more technologies under Bertrand than under Cournot
competition. For these parameter values a firm adopts full secrecy under Cournot
competition, while it adopts a selective patenting strategy, where the worst technolo-
gies are patented, under Bertrand competition. In other words, there is a greater
diusion of technology under Bertrand competition with weak protection.
25In particular, the conditional expected costs are H{L |L A {} = + { exp{{@} exp{@}
exp{{@}exp{@} and
H{L |L  {} =  { exp{{@}1exp{{@} . It is straightforward to show that these conditional expected costs
are increasing in  for all 0 ? {  .
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If, however, protection is su!ciently strong (e.g.,   max{1 1
4
> r}), then an
innovative firm patents fewer technologies under Bertrand competition than under
Cournot competition. Whereas firm L patents any technology (full patenting) for
marginally weaker than perfect patent protection under Cournot competition, it keeps
the most e!cient technologies secret under Bertrand competition. That is, technology
diusion is smaller under Bertrand competition when patent protection is strong.
4.2 Number of Competitors
The competitive pressure on the innovative firm increases when the number of non-
innovative firms, Q , increases (Boone, 2000). Increasing Q gives the following.
Proposition 5 Any extremal equilibrium threshold f in patenting strategy vf is non-
decreasing in Q , and any extremal equilibrium threshold e in ve is increasing in Q .
In other words, in equilibrium the entry of non-innovative firms gives a Cournot
competitor a greater or equal incentive to patent its innovation, while it gives a
Bertrand competitor a smaller incentive to apply for a patent.
An analysis of the best response functions can provide some intuition for these
results. The best response function ufL(q3L ; L) in (3.1), which captures the output
strategy of firm L, is only a function of the cumulative output of the non-innovative
firms, TQ 
PQ
n=1 tn. Therefore, it can be redefined as the best response to the
cumulative output per non-innovative firm:
UfL(btQ ; L) = 12
µ
 L  QbtQ¶ (4.1)
with btQ  TQ@Q . Adding the best response functions of non-innovative firms,
ufq(q3q; q) in (3.1) for q = 1> ==> Q with 1 = === = Q , and solving for the sum of their
outputs, TQ , at any output of firm L, and dividing by Q , gives the cumulative best
response per non-innovative firm:
UfQ(tL ; q) =
 q  tL
2 + (Q  1) (4.2)
The solution of (4.1) and (4.2) gives the equilibrium output levels of the innovative
firm and a non-innovative firm. Analogously for Bertrand competition, the system
of best response functions uec(p3c; c) in (3.7) for c 5 {L> 1> ==> Q} can be transformed
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into firm L’s best response to the cumulative price per non-innovative firm, and the
cumulative best response per non-innovative firm, respectively:
UeL(bsQ ; L) = 12
µ
L +
(1 )+ QbsQ
1 + (Q  1)
¶
(4.3)
UeQ(sL ; q) =
[1 + (Q  1)] q + (1 )+ sL
2 + (Q  1) (4.4)
with bsQ  PQn=1 sn@Q . Figure 4 illustrates these best responses for a given belief
about firm L’s technology (i.e., for some given subset S), and Q 0 A Q . In particular,
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Figure 4: Eects of entry (Q 0 A Q)
Figure 4(a) sketches the best response curves of Cournot competitors, and Figure 4(b)
gives these curves for Bertrand competitors. The thin (bold) curves represent the best
response curves when there are Q (respectively, Q 0) non-innovative firms.
Figure 4(a) illustrates the equilibrium output levels of the innovative firm with
the most e!cient technology, L = . If this firm adopts secrecy and it has Q
competitors, it supplies the output corresponding to point B in Fig. 4(a). If firm
L patents the technology  and has Q competitors, it reaches point D when the
patent is valid, and it reaches point C when the patent is invalid. An increase in
the number of non-innovative firms has the following eects on firm L’s patenting
incentive. On the one hand, it makes the best response UfL steeper. All else equal,
this makes the output dierence tfL(L > Q; {L})  tfL(L > Q;S) relatively bigger in
comparison to the dierence tfL(L > Q; {L})  tfL(L > QL ; {L}). In Fig. 4(a) this
would correspond to a disproportional increase of vertical distance B-D compared to
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the vertical distance C-D. Moreover, a steeper UfL also increases the dierence between
tfL(L > Q; {L}) + tfL(L > Q;S) and tfL(L > Q; {L}) + tfL(L > QL ; {L}). In Fig. 4(a)
this would correspond to an increase in the vertical distance B-C. Both eects of a
steeper own best response UfL augment the relative size of the right hand side of in
(3.3) in comparison to the left hand side. In other words, it gives a stronger signaling
eect. On the other hand, an increase in Q makes the best response UfQ less steep.
All else equal, this gives the opposite eects (i.e., vertical distance B-D decreases rel-
ative to distance C-D, and vertical distance B-C decreases), which is favorable for the
expropriation eect. Proposition 5 shows that the former eect dominates the latter.
That is, the overall eect of increasing Q is to strengthen the signaling eect relative
to the expropriation eect, and thereby give a greater incentive to apply for a patent.
As Fig. 4(a) illustrates for an increase from Q to Q 0, the best response UfL becomes
steeper, and UfQ becomes flatter.26 The vertical distance B0-C0 is greater than the
vertical distance B-C, whereas the proportions between the vertical distances B0-D0
and C0-D0 are equal to the proportions between the distances B-D and C-D.
Figure 4(b) considers Bertrand competition in the absence of patent protection
( = 0). First, I consider the case in which firm L competes with Q non-innovative
firms. Analogous to the discussion of Figure 2, if the firm hides a technology of below-
average e!ciency, then it can reach some price along the line A-B in Fig. 4(b). If firm
L has a technology such that its best response curve runs through point E, then the
firm is indierent between secrecy and technology sharing. The firm prefers to keep
more e!cient technologies secret, while it shares less e!cient technologies. Second,
similar incentives emerge in case there are Q 0 non-innovative firms. An increase in the
number of non-innovative firms (e.g. from Q to Q 0) makes the innovative firm’s best
response function UeL steeper, whereas it makes a non-innovative firm’s cumulative
best response UeQ less steep, as is illustrated in the figure. Both eects give a higher
cost L at which firm L is indierent between secrecy and technology sharing, for a
given belief. In Fig. 4(b) this is captured by the fact that the distance A0-E0 exceeds
the distance A-E, whereas the distance A0-B0 equals the distance A-B for a given
belief about firm L’s technology. Therefore, all else equal, firm L has an incentive to
keep more technologies secret after the number of non-innovative firms grows.27 The
26An increase of Q also shifts both best response functions inwards (towards the origin), but this
does not aect firm L’s incentives to patent its technology.
27For example, the uniform technology distribution gives a unique patenting equilibrium. In the
absence of protection, the patenting strategy for a uniformly distributed technology has the threshold
value: eX =   (  )@ [4 + (4Q  3)]. Clearly, eX increases in Q .
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proposition shows that this holds also in the presence of patent protection.
4.3 Product Dierentiation
An alternative way of increasing the competitive pressure on the innovative firm is to
increase the degree of substitutability between products,  (Boone, 2000).
The following proposition shows that an increase of the product substitutability
tends to increase patenting in equilibrium.
Proposition 6 Any extremal equilibrium threshold f in patenting strategy vf is non-
decreasing in . There exists a critical degree of substitutability, e A 0, such that
for all  ? e, any extremal equilibrium threshold e in strategy ve is decreasing in
. Moreover, if  = 0 (no protection), and the firms choose accommodating pricing
strategies, then any extremal equilibrium threshold e in ve is decreasing in .
A greater product substitutability gives an innovative firm a (weakly) greater
incentive to patent its innovation when the firms compete in quantities. An increase
of  makes the best response functions UfL in (4.1) and UfQ in (4.2) steeper. As argued
in the previous subsection, both eects yield a relatively stronger signaling eect.
Therefore, the innovative firm has a greater incentive to patent an innovation.
When firms compete in prices, the patenting incentive follows from a trade-o
between two opposing eects. An increase of  makes the best responses (4.3) and
(4.4) steeper. On the one hand, a steeper best response of firm L, UeL in (4.3), reduces
the incentive to share technologies. The previous subsection illustrates this point. On
the other hand, a steeper cumulative best response per non-innovative firm, UeQ in
(4.4), gives a greater incentive to patent technologies. Proposition 6 shows that the
latter eect tends to dominate.28
At the extreme where goods approach independence (i.e.,  $ 0), the signal-
ing eect diminishes. The remaining expropriation eect gives firm L a disincentive
to patent its technology. In the limit firm L does not patent any technology (i.e.,
lim<0 e =  and lim<0 f = ).29 For positive degrees of substitutability the firm
may have an incentive to patent some technologies in equilibrium (Propositions 1 and
28For example, in the absence of patent protection, the uniform technology distribution gives the
unique threshold eX =   (  )@ [4 + (4Q  3)]. Clearly, eX is decreasing in .
29Clearly, if  = 0, the markets are independent, and firm L is indierent between patenting and
secrecy. As a consequence, any patenting strategy can be sustained as an equilibrium strategy. If
 ? 0, then the goods are complements. As before, imitation gives the non-innovative firms an
incentive to set lower prices (higher outputs). In the case of complementary goods, the competitors’
price reduction (resp., output expansion) increases the demand and profit of the innovative firm. In
20
2). This suggests that, at least locally (for  close to zero), patenting incentives are
growing in the degree of substitutability. Proposition 6 confirms this.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I analyzed the eects of probabilistic patent validity on strategic patent
choices in an oligopoly with asymmetric information, and dierentiated goods. A
Cournot competitor tends to patent big innovations, and keep small innovations secret,
while a Bertrand competitor adopts the reverse strategy.
Changing the mode of product market competition has interesting eects on the
diusion of knowledge. If the patent protection is weak, then an innovative firm
patents more technologies under Bertrand competition than under Cournot compe-
tition. For su!ciently weak protection of intellectual property a firm adopts full
secrecy under Cournot competition, while it adopts a selective patenting strategy un-
der Bertrand competition. In this case, the bigger diusion of technology increases
the expected consumer surplus under Bertrand competition, which widens the surplus
gap between Bertrand and Cournot competition.
If, however, protection is su!ciently strong, but imperfect, then an innovative firm
patents more technologies under Cournot competition than under Bertrand compe-
tition. Whereas a Cournot competitor patents any innovation (due to an unraveling
result), a Bertrand competitor resorts to a selective patenting strategy. In this case
the greater technology diusion under Cournot competition increases the expected
consumer surplus under Cournot competition, and reduces the surplus gap between
Bertrand and Cournot competition.
Dierent measures of competitive pressure have dierent eects on the incentives
to patent a process innovation. An increase in the degree of substitutability tends to
increase the patenting incentives of accommodating firms. The eect of an increase
in the number of firms depends on the mode of competition in the product market.
An increase in the number of non-innovative firms gives an innovative firm a greater
incentive to patent when firms compete in output levels, but a smaller incentive when
firms compete in prices. In the latter case, an increase in the number of non-innovative
firms has two conflicting eect on the expected consumer surplus. On the one hand,
it increases the expected consumer surplus for a given level of technology diusion.
other words, expropriation gives the innovative firm an extra incentive to apply for a patent. Hence,
the basic trade-o between expropriation and signaling disappears, and the standard unraveling result
applies (i.e., the innovative firm patents all technologies), whenever the goods are complementary.
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This is a direct eect. On the other hand, it reduces the expected surplus through
a reduction in the diusion of technology. This is an indirect eect. That is, the
strategic management of intellectual property reduces the surplus gain from entry
of non-innovative firms. This may have implications for the optimal economic policy
towards entry in innovative industries with weak intellectual property right protection.
The model assumes that the firms choose their product market variables after
the patent validity is determined. Alternatively, one could consider the model where
the patent validity is determined after the firms set their product market variables.
In the subgame that starts after the innovative firm patents its technology, a non-
innovative firm chooses its product market variable that maximizes its expected profit
at the expected cost  + (1 )L . That is, in this model with reversed timing, the
profit from patenting is the profit at the competitors’ expected cost, instead of the
expected profit at the competitors’ realized costs. Although this changes the size of
the profit dierence, it does not change the direction in which this dierence changes
with parameter values (see Appendix C for further details). Therefore, reversing the
timing has no eect on the qualitative results.
The model with Bertrand competition can be extended easily by allowing all firms
to be innovative. In a simple model where patents are invalid (i.e.,  = 0), and the
technologies of firms are independent draws from their technology distributions, a
firm with access to a competitor’s technologies adopts the most productive technol-
ogy. This could be its own or its competitor’s technology. Therefore, it is uncertain
whether a shared technology will be adopted or not, since this depends on the rela-
tive e!ciency of both firms’ technology draws. Whereas in the model with one-sided
asymmetric information the probability of imitation was exogenously fixed, here it de-
pends on the size of the innovation, and the technology distribution of the competitor.
In spite of this dierence, the firms’ incentives to share technologies are similar to the
incentives with one-sided asymmetric information (see also Appendix C). As before,
a firm’s technology-sharing strategy trades o an expropriation eect against a sig-
naling eect. Moreover, a higher cost draw gives a weaker expropriation eect and a
stronger signaling eect. Consequently, each firm shares ine!cient technologies while
it keeps e!cient technologies secret as in Proposition 2. Jansen (2010) shows that the
introduction of several innovative firms in the model with Cournot competition has
more subtle eects on the firms’ patenting incentives.
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Appendix
A Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that the non-innovative firms have beliefs that are consistent with patenting
strategy (2.1). Then firm L keeps technology L secret if and only if inequality (3.3)
holds. This inequality is equivalent to xf(L ;S)  0 where:
xf(;S)  1   t
f
L(>Q; {})2  tfL(>Q;S)2
tfL(>Q; {})2  tfL(>Q; {})2
(A.1)
= 1  

2
(H{L |L 5 S} )
  
·
tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q;S)
tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q; {})
For any given set S, the function xf(;S) is increasing in  (see Appendix B). There-
fore, there can exist only equilibria with S = [f> ] for some   f  . In particular,
three situations may emerge in equilibrium.
(a) Firm L keeps all technologies secret in equilibrium (i.e., f = ), if and only
if xf(; [> ])  0 for all  5 [> ]. This inequality holds for all  if and only if
xf(; [> ])  0, since xf(; [> ]) is increasing in . The latter inequality holds if and
only if   r, where r is defined as (3.4).
(b) Firm L patents all technologies in equilibrium (i.e., f = ), if and only if
xf(; {})  0 for all  5 [> ]. This inequality holds if and only if xf(; {})  0,
since xf(; {}) is increasing in , which reduces to   1 
2
.
(c) Suppose that r ? 1 
4
, and take r ?  ? 1 
4
. If there exists an equilibrium
with S = [f> ] for some  ? f ? , then the threshold f is a root of function:
exf()  xf(; [> ]) (A.2)
for  5 [> ]. Evaluation of exf for extreme variable values gives the following. First,exf() = xf(; [> ]) ? 0 for  A r, as follows from part (b). Second, from (A.1) and
application of the De L’Hospital rule it follows that:
lim

exf() = 1   lim


2
(H{L |L A } )
  
·
tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q; [> ])
tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q; {})
= 1   lim


2
(H{L |L A } )
  
=
µ
1 
4
¶
 >
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since
lim

CH{L |L A }
C = lim
C
C
ÃZ 

i(})
1 I ()}g}
!
= lim

i()
1 I ()
µ
H{L |L A } 
¶
= i()lim

H{L |L A }) 
1 I () =
1
2
where the last equality follows from the application of the De L’Hospital rule, i.e.,
lim

H{L |L A }) 
1 I () = lim
i()
13I ()
³
H{L |L A } 
´
 1
i()
=
1
i()
 lim

H{L |L A } 
1 I ()
yielding
lim

H{L |L A }) 
1 I () =
1
2i()
Therefore, lim

exf() A 0 for  ? 1 
4
. Hence, for any r ?  ? 1 
4
, the intermediate
value theorem implies that there exists an interior f such that exf(f) = 0, sinceexf() ? 0 ? lim

exf(), and exf is continuous in . ¤
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that the non-innovative firms have beliefs that are consistent with patenting
strategy (2.1). Then firm L keeps technology L secret if and only if inequality (3.3)
holds, with f replaced by e. This inequality is equivalent to xe(L ;S)  0 where:
xe(;S)  1   p
e
L(>Q; {})2 peL(>Q;S)2
peL(>Q; {})2 peL(>Q; {})2
(A.3)
Using (3.9), this function can be written as:
xe(;S) = 1  

2
( H{L |L 5 S})
[1 + (Q  1)](  )
·
peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q;S)
peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q; {})
It is straightforward to show that xe is decreasing in  (see Appendix B). As a con-
sequence, there can only exist equilibria in which the patenting strategy (2.1) has
S = [> e] for some e 5 [> ].
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The evaluation of xe for extreme values of  yields the following. xe(> [> e]) A
0 A xe(> [> e]) for any e 5 [> ]. Consequently (due to continuity), only critical
values  ? e ?  can be consistent with the equilibrium patenting strategy. The
equilibrium threshold value e is the root of:
exe()  xe(> [> ]) (A.4)
Clearly, exe() = xe(> {}) A 0 for any  ? 1, and exe() = xe(> [> ]) ? 0. The
intermediate value theorem implies that a e exists, with  ? e ? , such thatexe(e) = 0. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3
In case of Cournot competition, notice that exf in (A.2) is continuous in  and de-
creasing in parameter .
First, consider the minimal threshold, fO. For   r, Proposition 1 (a) shows that
fO = . For r ?  ? 1 4 , Proposition 1 (c) shows that exf() ? 0 ? lim exf(), and
there exists an equilibrium with an interior threshold fO A . In this case, it follows
from Milgrom and Roberts (1994, Theorem 1) that the minimal interior threshold is
increasing in . For   max{r> 1  
4
}, both exf() and lim

exf() are non-positive.
In that case, if exf() has an interior root, then exf crosses zero from below at the
minimal root, and consequently the minimal root increases in . Otherwise, i.e., ifexf() has no interior root, fO = .
Second, consider the maximal threshold, fK . For   min{r> 1 2}, both exf()
and lim

exf() are non-negative. In that case, if exf() has an interior root, then exf
crosses zero from below at the maximal root, and consequently the maximal root
increases in . Otherwise, i.e., if exf() has no interior root, fK = . For r ?  ? 12 ,
Proposition 1 (b)-(c) show that the maximal root is interior (i.e.,  ? fK ? ), andexf() ? 0 ? lim

exf(). In this case, it follows from Milgrom and Roberts (1994,
Theorem 1) that the maximal interior threshold is increasing in . Finally, for  
1 
2
, Proposition 1 (b) shows that fK = .
Finally, in case of Bertrand competition, notice that the function exe in (A.4) is
continuous in , and it is decreasing in , i.e., Cexe@C ? 0 as follows immediately
from (A.3). An equilibrium threshold e is the root of exe() = 0. In the proof of
Proposition 2 I show that exe() A 0 A exe(). Then Milgrom and Roberts (1994,
Theorem 1) show that any extremal equilibrium threshold must be decreasing in .
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For  $ 1, xf(; [> ]) = 0 i  = H{L |L A }. Clearly, the only possible
equilibrium strategy is (2.1) with S = {}. Similarly, for  $ 1, xe(; [> ]) = 0 i
 = H{L |L  }, which gives uniquely S = {}.30 ¤
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3. It is easy to show that the functionexf() is decreasing in , since Cexf@CH{L |L A } ? 0, as follows from (A.1). Further,exe is increasing in , since Cexe@CH{L |L  } A 0 as follows easily from (A.3). Again,
using continuity of exf and exe, and applying Milgrom and Roberts (1994, Theorem 1)
gives the comparative statics results with respect to . ¤
Proof of Proposition 5
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3. In Appendix B, I show that the
function exf() is decreasing in Q for any given . Further, Appendix B shows thatexe is increasing in Q . Again, using continuity of exf and exe, and applying Milgrom
and Roberts (1994, Theorem 1) gives the comparative statics results on Q . ¤
Proof of Proposition 6
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3. First, Appendix B shows that the
function exf() is decreasing in  for any given . Second, Appendix B shows that
lim<0 Cexe@C ? 0. Due to continuity of Cexe@C in , there exists a critical degree
e A 0, such that exe is decreasing in  for all  ? e. Finally, if  = 0, then the root
of exe() = 0 equals the root of:
e!e()  12
µ
peL(>Q; [> ])peL(>Q; {})
¶
=
µ
1
 +Q  1
¶
Q(  ) Q
2
( H{L |L  })=
This function is non-decreasing in  at extremal roots, since it is continuous in , ande!e() A 0 A e!e(). Further, the function e!e is decreasing in parameter . Using these
properties, the continuity of exf, exe and e!e, and applying Milgrom and Roberts (1994,
Theorem 1) gives the comparative statics results on . ¤
30Any interior threshold (i.e.,  ? e ? ) cannot emerge in equilibrium, since a root of ee would
require that H{L |L  e} = e, which is impossible for non-degenerate p.d.f.-s. Also e =  cannot
emerge in equilibrium, since e(> [> ]) A 0 for any  A H{L}.
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B Basic Properties of x
First, I present the basic properties of xf in (A.1). Second, I present the basic prop-
erties of xe in (A.3).
B.1 Cournot Competition
Consider any given set S  [> ]. First, it is useful to show that xf(;S) in (A.1) is
decreasing in H{L |L 5 S}:
Cxf(;S)
CH{L |L 5 S}
=

2
  
·
tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q;S) +

2
Q(3H{L |LMS})
(2+Q)(23)
tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q; {})
=

2
  
·
2tfL(>Q;S)
tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q; {})
? 0 (B.1)
Dierentiating (B.1) with respect to  gives:
C2xf(;S)
CH{L |L 5 S}C
=

(  )2
·
tfL(>Q;S)
(23)+Q3
2
Q
(2+Q)(23) (  )
tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q; {})
 
  
·
2(23)+Q
(2+Q)(23)tfL(>Q;S)£
tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q; {})
¤2
? 
(  )2
·
tfL(>Q;S)
tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q; {})
? 0 (B.2)
Inequality (B.2) is useful to show that xf(;S) is increasing in  for any given S.
Cxf(;S)
C =

2
¡
 H{L |L 5 S}
¢
(  )2
·
tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q;S)
tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q; {})
+

2
( H{L |L 5 S})
  
·
C
C
µ tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q;S)
tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q; {})
¶
(B.3)
with
C
C
µ tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q;S)
tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q; {})
¶
=
C
C
µ
1 +
tfL(>Q;S) tfL(>Q; {})
tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q; {})
¶
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=

1
2
Q(23)
(2+Q)(23)
£
tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q; {})
¤£
tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q; {})
¤2
+
2(23)+Q
(2+Q)(23)
£
tfL(>Q;S) tfL(>Q; {})
¤£
tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q; {})
¤2
=
1
2
Q(2 )
£
2(2 )( ) + Q(  )
¤
(2 + Q)2(2 )2
£
tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q; {})
¤2
+
Q [2(2 ) + Q ]
£
    
2
(H{L |L 5 S} )
¤
(2 + Q)2(2 )2
£
tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q; {})
¤2
Since inequality (B.2) implies Cxf(;S)@C A Cxf(; {})@C, the following holds:
Cxf(;S)
C A 

2
·
C
C
µtfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q; {})
tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q; {})
¶
= 
2
·
1
2
Q(2 )2(2 )( )
(2 + Q)2(2 )2
£
tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q; {})
¤2 A 0
B.1.1 Number of Firms
Consider any given technology  ?  ? . The function exf() in (A.2) can be written
as:
exf() = 1   2 (H{L |L A } )
  
·
µ
1 +
tfL(>Q; [> ]) tfL(>Q; {})
tfL(>Q; {}) + tfL(>Q; {})
¶
= 1  

2
(H{L |L A } )
  
·
Ã
1 +
Q
£
  (1 
2
)  
2
H{L |L A }
¤
2(2 )( ) + Q(  )
!
Hence, dierentiating with respect to Q gives:
Cexf()
CQ =

2
(H{L |L A } )
  
·
C
CQ
Ã
1 +
Q
£
  (1 
2
)  
2
H{L |L A }
¤
2(2 )( ) + Q(  )
!
=

2
(H{L |L A } )
  
·
2(2 )( )
£
  (1 
2
)  
2
H{L |L A }
¤£
2(2 )( ) + Q(  )
¤2
? 0=
B.1.2 Degree of Substitutability
As before, for any given technology  ?  ? , the function exf() in (A.2) can be
written as:
exf() = 1   12 (H{L |L A } )
  
· 
Ã
1 +
Q
£
  (1 
2
)  
2
H{L |L A }
¤
2(2 )( ) + Q(  )
!
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Dierentiating this expression with respect to  gives:
Cexf()
C =
1
2
(H{L |L A } )
  
Ã
1 +
Q
£
  (1 
2
)  
2
H{L |L A }
¤
2(2 )( ) + Q(  )
+Q   (1 )  H{L |L A }
2(2 )( ) + Q(  )
+Q
£
  (1 
2
)  
2
H{L |L A }
¤ £
2( ) Q(  )
¤£
2(2 )( ) + Q(  )
¤2
!
=
1
2
(H{L |L A } )
  
Ã
1 +
Q
£
  (1 
2
)  
2
H{L |L A }
¤
4( )£
2(2 )( ) + Q(  )
¤2
+Q   (1 )  H{L |L A }
2(2 )( ) + Q(  )
¶
? 0=
B.2 Bertrand Competition
Consider any given set S  [> ]. First, it is useful to show that xe(;S) in (A.3) is
increasing in H{L |L 5 S}:
Cxe(;S)
CH{L |L 5 S}
=

2
[1 + (Q  1)](  )
·
peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q;S)
peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q; {})
+

2
[1 + (Q  1)](  )
·

2
· Q (H{L |L 5 S} )
peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q; {})
=

[1 + (Q  1)](  )
·
peL(>Q;S)
peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q; {})
A 0
Dierentiating this expression with respect to  gives:
C2xe(;S)
CH{L |L 5 S}C
=  p
e
L(>Q;S)
[1 + (Q  1)](  )2
£
peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q; {})
¤
 (1 )[2 + (2Q  1)] + [1 + (Q  1)]Q +

2
· Q
[1 + (Q  1)](  )
£
peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q; {})
¤
+p
e
L(>Q;S) (2(1 )[2 + (2Q  1)] + [1 + (Q  1)]Q)
[1 + (Q  1)](  )
£
peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q; {})
¤2
A  p
e
L(>Q;S)
[1 + (Q  1)](  )2
£
peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q; {})
¤ A 0
This inequality implies Cxe(;S)@C ? Cxe(; {})@C, where:
Cxe(; {})
C =
2Q [2 + (2Q  1)]
2[1 + (Q  1)] ·
peL(>Q; {})
peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q; {})
? 0
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Hence, xe(;S) is decreasing in  (i.e., Cxe(;S)@C ? 0).
B.2.1 Number of Firms
Consider any given technology  ?  ? . The function exe() in (A.4) can be written
as:
exe() = 1   2 ( H{L |L  })
[1 + (Q  1)](  )
·
µ
1 +
peL(>Q; [> ])peL(>Q; {})
peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q; {})
¶
= 1  

2
( H{L |L  })
  
Ã
1
1 + (Q  1) +
Q(  )
peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q; {})
 1
1 + (Q  1) ·
Q 
2
( H{L |L  })
peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q; {})
!
Dierentiating exe() with respect to Q gives:
Cexe()
CQ = 

2
( H{L |L  })
  
Ã
1
[1 + (Q  1)]2
"
1 Q

2
( H{L |L  })
peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q; {})
#

£
2(1 )(2 )( ) (Q)2(  )
¤£
peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q; {})
¤2
"
(  )

2
( H{L |L  })
1 + (Q  1)
#!
= 

2
( H{L |L  })
  
Ã
peL(>Q; [> ]) +peL(>Q; {})
[1 + (Q  1)]2
£
peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q; {})
¤

£
2(1 )(2 )( ) (Q)2(  )
¤ £
peL(>Q; [> ])peL(>Q; {})
¤
[1 + (Q  1)]
£
peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q; {})
¤2
!
= 

2
( H{L |L  })¡
  
¢
[1 + (Q  1)]2
£
peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q; {})
¤2!eQ
with
!eQ 
£
peL(>Q; [> ]) +peL(>Q; {})
¤
·
£
peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q; {})
¤

£
peL(>Q; [> ])peL(>Q; {})
¤
 1 + (Q  1)Q
£
2(1 )(2 )( ) (Q)2(  )
¤
First, it is obvious that:
peL(>Q; [> ]) +peL(>Q; {}) A
¯¯
peL(>Q; [> ])peL(>Q; {})
¯¯
= (B.4)
30
Second, for the comparison between the terms peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q; {}) and
1+(Q31)
Q
¯¯
2(1 )(2 )( ) (Q)2(  )
¯¯
, I distinguish the following cases.
(i) If 2(1 )(2 )( )  (Q)2(  ), then (3.9) gives:
peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q; {}) A
1 + (Q  1)
Q
¯¯¯¯
2(1 )(2 )( ) (Q)2(  )
¯¯¯¯
= (B.5)
Inequalities (B.4) and (B.5) imply that !eQ A 0. (ii) IfpeL(>Q; [> ])  peL(>Q; {})
and 2(1)(2)() A (Q)2(), then !eQ A 0 holds obviously. (iii) Finally,
if peL(>Q; [> ]) A peL(>Q; {}) and 2(1 )(2 )( ) A (Q)2( )), the
following holds:
!eQ A 4peL(>Q; {})2
p
e
L(>Q; [> ])peL(>Q; {})
Q [1 + (Q  1)] 2(1 )(2 )( )
A 4peL(>Q; {})2  2(1 )(2 ) [1 + (Q  1)]2 ( )2
= 2(1 )
¡
2(1 )[2 + (2Q  1)]2  (2 ) [1 + (Q  1)]2
¢
( )2 A 0
Hence, !eQ A 0 in any case, which gives Cexe()@CQ A 0, i.e., exe() is increasing in Q .
B.2.2 Degree of Substitutability
For any given technology  ?  ? , the function exe() in (A.4) can be written as:
exe() = 1 H{L |L  }
2
¡
  
¢ · 
1 + (Q  1)
µ
1 +
peL(>Q; [> ])peL(>Q; {})
peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q; {})
¶
Dierentiating exe() with respect to  gives:
Cexe
C = 
 H{L |L  }
2
¡
  
¢ ·  1
[1 + (Q  1)]2
µ
1 +
peL(>Q; [> ])peL(>Q; {})
peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q; {})
¶
+

1 + (Q  1) ·
C
C
µpeL(>Q; [> ])peL(>Q; {})
peL(>Q; {}) +peL(>Q; {})
¶¸
It is straightforward to show that taking the limit for  $ 0 gives:
lim
<0
Cexe
C = 
 H{L |L  }
2
¡
  
¢ ? 0
since lim
<0
peL(>Q;[>])3peL(>Q;{})
peL(>Q;{})+peL(>Q;{})
= 0, and lim
<0
C
C
³
peL(>Q;[>])3peL(>Q;{})
peL(>Q;{})+peL(>Q;{})
´
is finite.
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C Extensions
Here I analyze the following model extensions. First, I consider a divisible innovation.
Second, I reverse the timing. Finally, I analyze a model with two innovative firms.
C.1 Divisible Innovation
Consider a similar setting as in Anton and Yao (2003). That is, the innovative firm
with innovation L chooses to apply for a patent of technology wL with wL  L . As in
Anton and Yao (2003), I focus on an equilibrium in which firm L patents its innovation,
and the firm’s patenting strategy is fully revealing. In other words, I suppose that firm
L patents according to the monotonic strategy *(L), such that *(L)  L and *() =
. Hence, the non-innovative firms infer from observing patented technology wL that
firm L has technology *31(wL). Whereas Anton and Yao (2003) analyze the incentives
to patent a drastic innovation, I analyze a model with a non-drastic innovation here.
C.1.1 Equilibrium outputs
Given equilibrium inferences, a non-innovative firm with technology q 5 {wL > } sets
the output tfq(q> *31(wL) + (Q  1)q; {q}) in equilibrium, where tfq is defined in
(3.2) for q = 1> ==> Q . Firm L plays a best response against these output levels, i.e.,
tWL (L > q; wL) = ufL(qfq(•); L)
=
1
2
µ
 L  Qtfq(q> *31(wL) + (Q  1)q; {q})
¶
=
1
2 +Q
µ
 L +
Q
2
(q  L) +
2Q
2(2 )
£
q  *31(wL)
¤¶
(C.1)
In equilibrium, firm L’s product market profit equals: WL(L > q; wL) = tWL (L > q; wL)2.
C.1.2 Equilibrium patenting
The expected profit of firm L with technology L from patenting wL , given beliefs
consistent with strategy *, is:
L(L > wL)  WL(L > ; wL) + (1 )WL(L > wL ; wL)
Hence, the optimal patenting strategy satisfies CL(L > wL)@CwL = 0, which is equivalent
to:
tWL (L > ; wL)
CtWL (L > ; wL)
CwL
+ (1 )tWL (L > wL ; wL)
CtWL (L > wL ; wL)
CwL
= 0 (C.2)
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where
CtWL (L > ; wL)
CwL
=
Q
2(2 )(2 +Q) · 
g*31(wL)
gwL
and
CtWL (L > wL ; wL)
CwL
=
Q
2(2 )(2 +Q)
µ
2 g*
31(wL)
gwL
¶
Substituting these expressions in the first order condition (C.2) gives:
£
tWL (L > ; wL) + (1 )tWL (L > wL ; wL)
¤
g*
31(wL)
gwL
= 2(1 )tWL (L > wL ; wL)
or
g*31(wL)
gwL
=
2(1 )tWL (L > wL ; wL)

£
tWL (L > ; wL) + (1 )tWL (L > wL ; wL)
¤
By using *(L) = wL , this equality is equivalent to:
g*(L)
gL
=

2
µ
1 +

1  ·
tWL (L > ;*(L))
tWL (L > *(L);*(L))
¶
/
g*(L)
gL
=

2
µ
1 +

1 

1 +
tWL (L > ;*(L)) tWL (L > *(L);*(L))
tWL (L > *(L);*(L))
¸¶
Using (C.1), this can be written as:
g*(L)
gL
=

2
Ã
1
1  +

1  ·
Q
£
  *(L)
¤
(2 ) ( L) + Q [*(L) L ]
!
(C.3)
A solution to dierential equation (C.3), which satisfies *(L)  L and *() = , is
an equilibrium patenting strategy. I denote the equilibrium strategy by b*.
First, in the absence of protection (i.e.,  = 0) the dierential equation (C.3)
reduces to: *0(L) = 2 . By using the condition *() = , this gives the equilibrium
strategy b*(L) = 2L +(1 2 ), which is similar to (14) in Anton and Yao (2003). In
equilibrium, the innovative firm patents technologies of relatively low e!ciency (i.e.,
L  2 + (1

2
)), while it does not patent technologies that are more e!cient.
Second, if protection is strong, it is possible to obtain an explicit solution too.
Clearly, it follows from applying the constraints *(L)  L and *(L)   to equation
(C.3), that *0(L)  2 · 113 for any L . If   1 

2
, then the inequality becomes
*0(L)  1 for any L , which implies that the constraint *(L)  L becomes binding.
Therefore, the equilibrium strategy gives full patenting (i.e., b*(L) = L for any L)
if   1 
2
. For su!ciently strong protection, the signaling eect dominates, which
gives firm L an incentive to patent its innovation completely.
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Finally, for intermediate values of the protection parameter (i.e., 0 ?  ? 1 
2
),
dierential equation (C.3) is di!cult to solve analytically. For a numerical example
(i.e.,  = 4,  = 1, Q = 1,  = 0, and  = 1), I approximated some solutions of (C.3)
numerically for dierent intermediate values of .31 These solutions are sketched
in Figure 5. The figure suggests that for su!ciently weak protection parameters
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Figure 5: Equilibrium patenting (divisible innovation)
(e.g.,   0=45), the innovative firm keeps its most e!cient technologies secret, and
signals by patenting only lesser e!cient technologies (i.e., b*(L) A L). Moreover, the
numerical examples suggest that the equilibrium strategies are concave in L . Also this
means that firm L tends to skew its patenting strategy in the direction of ine!cient
technologies. For protection parameter values close to 1
2
(e.g.,  = 0=475), concavity
of the equilibrium strategy gives full patenting of e!cient technologies, and partial
patenting for less e!cient technologies (i.e., b*(L) = L if L  b, and b*(L) A L ifb ? L ? , for some b with  ? b ? ). Finally, Figure 5 suggests that stronger
patent protection gives the innovative firm an incentive to patent a greater part of its
innovation (i.e., Cb*(L)@C ? 0 for any L). This is consistent with Proposition 3.
If protection is weak, the description of the equilibrium strategy b* suggests that
it is an increasing, concave transformation of L , i.e., b* : [> ]$ [+ (1 )> ] for
some 0 ?  ? 1, where b*() =  + (1  ) and b*() = . The properties of the
31I used Wolfram Mathematica 6 to solve the dierential equation numerically.
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equilibrium strategy give the following inequality: b*(L)  L + (1 )   for any
L 5 [> ]. Then, for any | 5 [ + (1  )> ], the distribution of b*() relates as
follows to the distribution of :
I¡*()(|) = Pr[b*()  |] = Pr[  b*31(|)] = I(b*31(|))=
Clearly, if | 5 [>  + (1  )], then I¡*()(|) = 0. The distribution of patented
technologies b*() is therefore:
I¡*()(|) =
½
0> if   | ?  + (1 )>
I(b*31(|))> if  + (1 )  |  =
Clearly, if   | ? +(1), then I¡*()(|) = 0  I(|). The inverse transformationb*31 : [ + (1  )> ] $ [> ] is an increasing, convex function, which satisfies the
inequality b*31(|)    1 ¡  |¢  | for any | 5 [ + (1  )> ]. Hence, if
+(1 )  |  , then I¡*()(|) = I(b*31(|))  I(|). In short, I¡*()(|)  I(|)
for any | 5 [> ], i.e., the distribution of b*(L) first-order stochastically dominates
the distribution of L . The equilibrium strategy b* skews the technology distribution
towards ine!cient technologies.
Similarly, if the protection parameter is close to 1 
2
, then the numerical analysis
suggests that there exists a threshold level b, with  ? b ? , such that the equilibrium
strategy is:
b*() = ( > if    ? b>j()> if b    >
where j : [b> ]$ [b> ] is an increasing, concave function with j(b) = b and j() = .
Using similar arguments as before, the distribution of b* becomes:
I¡*()(|) =
(
I(|)> if   | ? b>
I(j31(|))> if b  |  =
Convexity of j31 in combination with j31(b) = b and j31() =  yields: j31(|)  | for
any b  |  . This implies that I¡*()(|)  I(|) for any | 5 [> ]. In summary, the
equilibrium patenting strategy appears to be such that the distribution of the patented
technologies first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of technologies.
In both cases, the equilibrium patenting strategy skews the technology distribu-
tion towards ine!cient technologies. That is, when the innovation is divisible, then
an innovative firm tends to patent small innovations to a greater extent than big
innovations. By contrast, Proposition 1 shows that the firm has an incentive to do
the opposite (i.e., patent big innovations to a greater extent than small innovations),
when its innovation is non-divisible.
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C.2 Timing
Consider the model where the patent validity is determined after the firms set their
product market variables. In the subgame that starts after firm L patents its tech-
nology, a non-innovative firm chooses its product market variable that maximizes its
expected profit q(•; +(1 )L) for q 5 {1> ==> Q}, and firm L expects to earn the
profit uL(L > Q [ + (1 )L ]; {L}) in equilibrium for u 5 {f> e}.
C.2.1 Cournot competition
For any given S  [> ] and L 5 [> ], firm L prefers secrecy if fL(L > Q;S) 
fL(L > Q [ + (1 )L ]; {L}), which is equivalent to W f(L ;S)  0, where:
W f(;S)  1   
2
·
H{L |L 5 S} 
  
=
Clearly, W f(;S) is increasing in , and W f(; [> ])  0/   1 
2
· H{L}33 , while
W f(; {})  0/   1 
2
. Further, for the continuous function eW f()  W f(; [> ])
and for 1 
2
· H{L}33 ?  ? 1

4
, it is easily verified that eW f() ? 0 ? lim W f().
These basic properties are similar to those in the proof of Proposition 1.
For the proofs of Propositions 3-6 related to Cournot competition, it is su!cient
to verify that eW f() is decreasing in , decreasing in H{L |L A }, non-increasing in
Q , and decreasing in .
C.2.2 Bertrand competition
For any given S  [> ] and L 5 [> ], firm L prefers secrecy if eL(L > Q;S) 
eL(L > Q [ + (1 )L ]; {L}), which is equivalent to W e(L ;S)  0, where:
W e(;S)  1  

2
( H{L |L 5 S})
[1 + (Q  1)](  )
=
Clearly, W f(;S) is decreasing in . Further, for the continuous function eW f() 
W f(; [> ]) it is easily verified that eW f() A 0 A W f(). These basic properties are
similar to those in the proof of Proposition 2.
For the proofs of Propositions 3-6 related to Bertrand competition, it is su!cient
to verify that eW e() is decreasing in , increasing in H{L |L  }, increasing in Q ,
and decreasing in .
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C.3 Two-Sided Asymmetric Information
Consider the model where there are two innovative firms, L1 and L2, and no non-
innovative firms (Q = 0). At the beginning of the game each firm receives a draw
from the interval [> ]. Firm c’s technology c has the distribution Ic : [> ] $
[0> 1] with c 5 {L1> L2}. The draws L1 and L2 are independent. Subsequently, the
firms choose simultaneously whether to patent the innovation or keep it secret. To
simplify the analysis, I assume that patents are invalid, i.e.,  = 0, and firms choose
accommodating pricing strategies.
First, I present the equilibrium pricing strategies. Second, I characterize the
patenting strategies.
C.3.1 Pricing strategies
Take any subset Sn  [> ] and Pn  [> ]\Sn, and assume that firm c has beliefs
consistent with the adoption of the following generic patenting strategy by firm n (for
c> n 5 {L1> L2} and c 6= n):
bvn(n) = ½ B> if n 5 Snn> if n 5 Pn (C.4)
That is, the expected cost of firm n after adoption of secrecy is H{n|n 5 Sn}.
If both firms share their technologies, then they set equilibrium prices which yield
the following price-cost margins (for c> n 5 {L1> L2} and c 6= n):
pSSc (c; c> n)  sSSc (c; c> n)min{c> n} =
1 
2 
µ
min{c> n}
¶
= (C.5)
If both firms keep their technologies secret, firm c chooses the following price-cost
margin in equilibrium (for c> n 5 {L1> L2} and c 6= n):
pVVc (c;Sc>Sn) = sVVc (c;Sc>Sn) c =
1 
2 
µ
 c
¶
(C.6)
+

4 2
µ
H{n|n 5 Sn} c +

2
[H{c|c 5 Sc} c]
¶
=
If firm c shares technology c and firm n conceals, the firms’ first-order conditions
are as follows (for c> n 5 {L1> L2} and c 6= n):
2sc(c) = (1 )+ c + 
Z
MSn
in(|n 5 Sn)sn(> c)g
and 2sn(n> c) = (1 )+min{c> n}+ sc(c)=
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In this case (firm c shares, firm n conceals) firm c sets the following equilibriummargin:
pSVc (c; c>Sn) = sSVc (c; c>Sn) c (C.7)
=
1 
2 
µ
 c
¶
+

4 2
µ
H (min{c> n}|n 5 Sn) c
¶
>
withH (min{c> n}|n 5 Sn) = In(n|n 5 Sn)H{n|n  c> n 5 Sn}+[1 In(n|n 5 Sn)] c.
Similarly, if firm c hides c and firm n shares, firm c sets the following price-cost margin
in equilibrium (for c> n 5 {L1> L2} and c 6= n):
pVSc (c;Sc> n) = sVSc (c;Sc> n)min{c> n} (C.8)
=
1 
2 
µ
min{c> n}
¶
+

4 2
µ
n min{c> n}
+

2
[H (min{c> n}|c 5 Sc)min{c> n}]
¶
=
Firm c’s expected equilibrium product market profit is (for any wc and wn):
wcwnc (c; •) =
1
1 2p
wcwn
c (c; •)2 (C.9)
C.3.2 Patenting strategies
Proposition 7 If  = 0, then in any equilibrium, and for any l 5 {L1> L2}, firm l
chooses the patenting rule vel in (C.4) with Sl = [> el ] for some  ? el ? .
Proof. Suppose that firm n chooses the technology sharing rule bvn in (C.4).
Further, suppose that firm n has beliefs consistent with (C.4), with n = c, for some
subsets Sc  [> ] and Pc = [> ]\Sc. Given these assumptions, the dierence of the
expected profit from technology sharing and secrecy for firm c is:
[(c;Sc>Sn) 
Z
nMPn
£
SSc (c; c> n) VSc (c;Sc> n)
¤
in(n)gn
+
Z
nMSn
£
SVc (c; c>Sn) VVc (c;Sc>Sn)
¤
in(n)gn
where
SSc (c; c> n) VSc (c;Sc> n) =
1
1 2
µ
pSSc (c; c> n)2 pVSc (c;Sc> n)2
¶
=
1
1 2 [p
SS
c (c; c> n)pVSc (c;Sc> n)]
·[pSSc (c; c> n) +pVSc (c;Sc> n)]
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and a similar expression for SVc (c; c>Sn)  VVc (c;Sc>Sn). The evaluation of [ at
extreme values of c gives the following: [(;Sc>Sn) ? 0  [(;Sc>Sn) for any Sc
and Sn. The second derivative of [ equals:
C2[(c;Sc>Sn)
C2c
=
1
1 2
Z
nMPn
µCpSSc (c; c> n)
Cc
 Cp
VS
c (c;Sc> n)
Cc
¶
·
µCpSSc (c; c> n)
Cc
+
CpVSc (c;Sc> n)
Cc
¶
in(n)gn
+
1
1 2 Pr[n 5 Sn]
µCpSVc (c; c>Sn)
Cc
 Cp
VV
c (c;Sc>Sn)
Cc
¶
·
µCpSVc (c; c>Sn)
Cc
+
CpVVc (c;Sc>Sn)
Cc
¶
+ 2pSVc (c; c>Sn)
C2pSVc (c; c>Sn)
C2c
¸
since for any c 5 [> ]
C2pSSc (c; c> n)
C2c
=
C2pVSc (c;Sc> n)
C2c
=
C2pVVc (c;Sc>Sn)
C2c
= 0
First, using (C.5) and (C.8), it is immediate that
CpSSc (c;c>n)
Cc 
CpVSc (c;Sc>n)
Cc  0
and
CpSSc (c;c>n)
Cc +
CpVSc (c;Sc>n)
Cc  0 for any c and n, since Cmin{c> n}@Cc  0.
Second, using (C.6) and (C.7), gives
CpSVc (c;c>Sn)
Cc 
CpVVc (c;Sc>Sn)
Cc A 0 and
CpSVc (c;c>Sn)
Cc +
CpVVc (c;Sc>Sn)
Cc ? 0, since CH (min{c> n}|n 5 Sn) @Cc = Pr[n 5 Sn _ [c> ]]@Pr[n 5
Sn] 5 [0> 1]. Finally,
C2pSVc (c; c>Sn)
C2c
=

4 2 ·
C2H (min{c> n}|n 5 Sn)
C2c
 0=
Hence, C2[(c;Sc>Sn)@C2c  0, i.e., [(c;Sc>Sn) is (weakly) concave in c. This fact,
in combination with [(; •) ? 0  [(; •), implies that firm c’s equilibrium patenting
strategy is (C.4) for n = c, with Sc = [> ec] for some   ec  . The evaluation of
[(; [> ]>Sn) for extreme values of  gives:
[(; [> ]>Sn) ? 0 ? [(; [> ]>Sn)
for any Sn  [> ], Hence, the intermediate value theorem implies that (for any
Sn  [> ]) there exists a ec, with  ? ec ? , such that [(ec; [> ec]>Sn) = 0.
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